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We examine the strategic non-revelation of information by patent applicants. In a model
of a bilateral search of information, we show that patent applicants may conceal information,
and that examiners make their screening intensity contingent upon the received information.
We then analyze the e⁄ects of a double review policy and a policy in which examiners ex
ante commit to screening e⁄orts. The implementation of the former policy reduces strategic
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screening intensity across all applications, requires a limited commitment power and induces
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11 Introduction
In an economy that strongly relies on patents to encourage innovation and spur knowledge
dissemination, the existing set of related inventions or prior art plays a crucial role to gauge
and reward the creative e⁄ort of innovators. From the early decision of the innovator to ￿le
for a patent to its ￿nal granting by the patent examiner, most of the innovation patenting
process arguably revolves around ￿nding, reporting, and checking the prior art surrounding the
innovation under scrutiny. Ultimately, the quality of patent applications compounded with the
search ability of examiners explain to a large extend the outcome of the patenting process.
In this paper, we build a theoretical model to analyze the patenting process with two im-
portant features in mind. First, we allow both innovators and examiners to search for the
innovation￿ s prior art and, through it, to learn about its patentability. Second, we allow inno-
vators to naturally in￿ uence the examiner￿ s search process through the patent application they
draft. Speci￿cally, applicants can decide to withhold citations to relevant prior art that is known
to them. We argue that this strategic concealment of relevant citations can make the examiner￿ s
inference process harder, thereby, allowing the issuance of ￿low quality￿patents.
The question of low quality patents is a recurrent one in patent policy. Recent studies have
questioned the performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (PTO) performance and,
in particular, examiners are often accused of granting dubious patents. The patent quality
problem is arguably related to the number of prior art citations included in the patent. There
exists empirical evidence that supports the fact that examiners are less informed than applicants
about relevant prior art, and may face particular challenges in searching for it (Ja⁄e and Lerner,
2005). On the other hand, other studies point to the scarcity of prior art citations by applicants.
For instance, Alcacer and Gittelman (2006) show that, over the period 2001-2003, forty percent
of patents had all citations (i.e., prior art information) listed by examiners. These empirical
observations are not necessarily in contradiction. Rather, they suggest, in a non-exclusive way,
that patent applicants may not have the proper incentives to search and reveal prior art, and
that examiners may have a hard time ￿nding relevant prior art in some ￿elds.1
1This may be especially true for emerging ￿elds. For instance, at the beginning of 2000, e-commerce was a
new technological ￿eld. See Coppel (2000), Kesan (2002), Lemley (2001), and Merges (1999) for a discussion
on the relevance of the patent protection system in the e-commerce world. Many ￿business-method software￿
patents have little prior art. According to Greg Aharonian, slightly fewer than half of all patents, over a period
2In the absence of thorough knowledge of existing innovations, it is di¢ cult for patent ex-
aminers to assess the novelty of innovations. In the U.S. patent system, to be patentable, an
innovation must be useful, novel and non-obvious. A patent application must contain references
to previous literature and patents upon which the innovation improves or from which it diverges.
The nature of prior art is diverse and any relevant piece of evidence can constitute prior art; for
instance, it can be a thesis in a French university or an article in a scienti￿c journal. Applicants
should provide information to demonstrate that the innovation has not yet been patented or
published prior to the time the patent is ￿led. Legally, they have a duty of candor in disclosing
prior art information,2 but they have no duty to search for it: applicants must only disclose in-
formation of which they are aware. Moreover, according to the doctrine of inequitable conduct,
they should disclose all relevant information they have, and should not disclose false information
with the intent to deceive the PTO. However, the PTO has made it clear that applications will
not be investigated and rejected based on violation of the duty to disclose prior art, as the PTO
is not well-equipped to enforce such a rule (Kesan, 2002). Hence, applicants have no explicit
(and possibly weak) incentives to search for relevant information, and perhaps even fewer to
reveal it.3
We investigate the determinants of patent quality by focusing on the information gathering
processes performed by applicants and patent examiners. Our modeling framework of the patent-
ing process is a sequential bilateral information gathering game. We model a patent examiner
as an imperfect ￿auditor,￿whose task is to determine patent validity. Arguably, establishing
the patentability of an innovation depends both on the quality of the information cues (e.g.,
innovation attributes, prior art cited) provided by the applicant and on the quality of the in-
formation sources used by the examiner (e.g., prior art database). An examiner knows that the
of 20 years, cite no non-patent prior art, and the average patent cites about two non-patent prior art items
(http://www.bustpatents.com/).
2In the European patent system, an innovation must be novel, mark an inventive step and be commercially
applicable. Unlike in the US system, innovators do not have to provide a full list of prior art. The European patent
o¢ ce provides a search report to the innovator, who decides whether or not to request the patent examination
(Graham, Hall, Harho⁄ and Mowery, 2002).
3This is again consistent with empirical ￿ndings by Sampat (2009); many applicants do not search for, or fail
to disclose, prior art, as suggested by the fact that examiners tend to insert relevant patents that are owned by
the applicants themselves. It is unlikely that applicants are unable to ￿nd information about their own patents.
Lerner (2002) presents examples of ￿nancial patents where the prior art cited seems clearly incomplete.
3prior art reported in the application depends on the ￿eld to which the innovation belongs but
also can vary across ￿rms. For instance, in mature ￿elds ￿say pharmaceuticals ￿an examiner
often has rich prior art databases and is able to perform a quick and exhaustive prior art search.
Moreover, she expects to receive more prior art, as she believes it is more abundant and freely
available. This is unlike emerging ￿elds where prior art, which may or may not be abundant, is
often unavailable to examiners as it is more likely to appear in scienti￿c publications or other
sources.4 However, to the extent that non cited prior art will more likely result in a legal suit
after the patent has been granted, applicants who have a strong litigation skills will be less
hesitant to conceal prior art.
Overall, the examiner does not (fully) know whether or not the innovation has a lot of prior
art surrounding it. With this uncertainty in mind, she must process the application with what
the applicant has chosen to disclose. In this setup, releasing less information cues essentially
increases the screening cost of the examiner, who, in turn, performs less scrutiny on applications
with low informational content. Applicants have private information about the patentability
of their innovations, which creates incentives for those with ￿bad￿innovations to conceal some
information so as to maximize their chances of getting through the patent process.
Our objective is to address several questions: What is the behavior of applicants when
applying for a patent? What should be the optimal patent examiner response to a given patent
application? How are the applicant￿ s search e⁄ort and the examiner￿ s scrutiny related?
In the absence of scrutiny commitment, we show that the screening intensity of an examiner
is contingent upon the level of prior art transmitted. Applicants with ￿bad￿innovations tend to
conceal some prior art to decrease the examiner￿ s level of scrutiny. However, always concealing
prior art when the innovation is not patentable sharply raises the quality of the applications
with abundant prior art. Thus, full concealment cannot be an equilibrium either. Although our
main focus is to develop a theoretical framework to analyze the behavior of patent applicants,
we wonder whether our equilibrium analysis re￿ ects existing behaviors.
In a recent contribution, Allison and Hunter (2006) describe the change in the behavior
of applicants that has occurred after the PTO strengthened the application review procedure
4This is because in these ￿elds, when prior art exists, it is usually not in the form of patents. As pointed out
by Ja⁄e and Lerner (2004), ￿Patent examiners are not very good at ￿nding non-patented prior art.￿Allison and
Hunter (2006) and Sampat (2009) make similar observations.
4for innovations belonging to a speci￿c emerging ￿eld. This program, called the Second Pair of
Eyes Review (SPER), consists of a second examination of patents granted in the main class 705
(e.g., data processing, ￿nancial, business practice). Allison and Hunter (2006) ￿nd that many
applicants seem to alter the nature of their patent applications in order to avoid the additional
scrutiny of the SPER program.5 We analyze the e⁄ects of the introduction of a second review
in our theoretical framework and show it indeed results in a change of applicants￿behavior.
Lastly, we introduce another policy, in which we investigate whether the examiner￿ s ex ante
commitment to a certain level of scrutiny can induce applicants to search for prior art, and to
reveal their ￿ndings. We ￿nd that an examiner should not have di⁄erent scrutiny levels but
rather, should commit to an equal screening intensity across all applications. This simple rule
has two advantages: ￿rst, it requires a limited commitment and, second, it induces truthful
information transmission from applicants.
Most of the patent literature has focused on the importance of patent litigation (Lanjouw
and Schankerman, 2001) or settlement in case of patent infringements (Crampes and Langinier,
2002). Many contributions are concerned with the patent rules that a⁄ect the value of a patent
in the context of sequential innovation (Chang, 1995; Scotchmer, 1996; O￿ Donoghue, 1998).
Recently, attention has been brought to the problem of search of prior art, yet no formal frame-
work has emerged to analyze the patent granting process (Farrell and Merges, 2004; Kesan, 2002;
Lemley, 2001; Merges, 1999). Our paper is a contribution to this literature. Little attention
has been devoted to issues related to the search and revelation of prior art information in the
patent literature. Related to our model, Caillaud and DuchŒne (2005) are concerned with the
￿overload￿problem facing the patent o¢ ce. In their model, a patent examiner undertakes a
costly search and examination that depend on the volume of applications. We do not account
for the overload problem in our setting. A recent study is concerned with the incentives of
innovators to search for prior art before undertaking any R&D investments, and after, but with
no strategic revelation of information (Atal and Bar, 2008).
Because of the lack of accessible data, only recently has some empirical attention been focused
5In practice, the PTO sorts out applications according to relevant prior art categories. Each of these categories
has a team of specialized examiners in a particular prior art ￿eld. As noted by Allison and Hunter (2006), this
sorting process often gives rise to strategic drafting, as ￿skilled patent attorneys can often draft applications so
as to opt out of a prede￿ned category.￿For a concise description of the patenting process, see also Lerner (1995).
5on prior art problems (Alcacer and Gittelman, 2006; Alcacer, Gittelman and Sampat, 2009).
The roles of patent examiners and applicants have been studied and the ￿ndings from these
analyses are mostly consistent with issues we are tackling in this paper. In a recent empirical
analysis, Lampe (2008) shows that innovators conceal information about prior art that is closely
related to their innovation. Although Lampe (2008) does not take into account the role of the
PTO, these results validate our main ￿ndings that applicants have an incentive not to reveal all
of the prior art.
Other remedies have been suggested to improve the patent system. New ways of rewarding
patent examiners can be proposed, or an opposition system similar to what exists in Europe can
be implemented (Merges, 1999).6 However, it is not just the patent examiners￿responsibility;
applicants are liable, too. Because it is well-established that (non-patent) prior art information is
not easily available and that the PTO does not (and cannot) enforce the ￿doctrine of inequitable
conduct,￿ 7 applicants have no incentive to search for prior art, although intuition suggests that
applicants, being familiar with their innovation, know where to search. Hence, in many instances,
the relevant information exists and can be accessed at a cost.8
Another strand of related literature is the literature on auditing and monitoring. In the
context of a principal-agent model, it is showed that contracts must sometimes reward agents
for announcing bad news (Levitt and Snyder, 1997). Similar to our model, the principal commits
ex ante to an ine¢ cient ex post outcome. Also related to our analysis, Khalil￿ s (1997) model
studies the optimal contract when there is no commitment to an audit policy from the principal.
More recently, the strategic e⁄ect of monitoring versus auditing has been studied as well as
the problem of audit in a sequential game without commitment (Strausz, 2005; Mitusch, 2006).
In common with this literature, we show that in the absence of any credible mechanism for
committing to an auditing procedure, there is no plausible equilibrium in which only good
applicants apply for patents.
6For details on the opposition system, see Graham, Hall, Harho⁄ and Mowery (2002) and Friebel, Koch, Prady
and Seabright (2006) for a detailed report on the European Patent O¢ ce.
7See Kesan (2002) for details about the law. Farrell and Merges (2004) are also in favor of providing better
incentives for applicants to ￿nd and disclose prior art.
8On the website Bountyquest.com, one can post an announcement to ￿nd prior art concerning a patent for a
reward of from $10,000 to $30,000. There exist other websites where prior art information can also be added to
a patent (e.g., PatentFizz).
6The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model and the technologies
of patent examination and prior art search. In section 3, we show that, in the non-commitment
case, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. An equilibrium exists in mixed strategies in
which the applicant does not always reveal information. In section 4, we analyze the e⁄ects of
the introduction of the SPER initiative. Section 5 is devoted to the analysis of a situation in
which the examiner ex ante commits to certain scrutiny levels. We conclude and derive policy
implications in section 6.
2 The Model
We consider a sequential game with two players: a patent applicant endowed with an innovation
and a representative examiner who must judge the granting of a patent.9 At the outset, neither
the applicant nor the examiner knows the value of the innovation. A ￿good￿innovation should
be granted a patent as it is novel, non-obvious and useful. A ￿bad￿innovation should be refused
a patent, as it is a non-patentable innovation that infringes upon existing patents or is not
novel. Both the applicant and the examiner share common prior beliefs about the nature of the
innovation: it is good with probability p.
The private (respectively, social) value of a good innovation that is granted a patent is V G
(respectively, WG); whereas it is V R (respectively, WR), when it is refused a patent, with
V G > V R (WG > WR).10 The upper (respectively, lower) bar indicates a good (respectively,
bad) innovation, and the subscript G (respectively, R) indicates that the innovation is granted
(respectively, refused) a patent. The applicant derives a positive bene￿t from exploiting his non-
patented good innovation because it is new. On the other hand, the private (respectively, social)
value of a bad innovation that is granted a patent is V G (respectively, WG) and 0 (respectively,
WR) if a patent is refused, with V G > 0 (WR > WG). The applicant prefers to be granted a
9We consider that the PTO and patent examiners have the same objective functions and, thus, the PTO
and PTO examiners represent the same decision maker. However, it is unlikely that they always have the same
objectives. Langinier and Marcoul (2009) analyze the problem of examiners￿career concerns.
10Note that since a patent result in monopoly rights for the applicant, ex post the PTO examiner should never
grant any patent to a valuable innovation. Such a behavior would dampen any incentives to patent. As such, our
assumption that W G > W R means that our representative examiner has ex ante as well as ex post bene￿ts in
mind.
7patent on a bad innovation, as the probability of it being invalidated in court is relatively small, or
a trial may invalidate only part of the claims. Overall, V G > V G, and ￿V ￿ V G￿V G￿V R > 0,
that is, the di⁄erence in private value between good and bad innovations is greater when the
innovation is patented. Furthermore, the granting of a patent on a good innovation has a higher
(or potentially equal) social value than refusing a patent on a bad innovation, which, in turn,
has a higher value than refusing a patent on a good innovation, which is better than granting
a patent on a bad innovation, i.e., WG ￿ WR > WR > WG. This assumption implies that
WG￿WG > WR￿WR. Finally, we de￿ne ￿W ￿ WG￿WR￿WG+WR > 0, which represents
the social gain from avoiding errors (an error being refusing a patent on a good innovation, or
granting a patent on a bad innovation).
In the model, we assume that the innovator has a better information about the inventive
degree of his innovation than the PTO examiner. However, by scrutinizing the application, the
latter will eventually ￿nd out whether the innovation is patentable or not.
To determine whether an innovation is patentable or not, the examiner must search for the
existing prior art. The existence (or the non existence) of prior art is arguably an important
determinant of the patentability of the innovation. At the outset, the examiner does not know
whether there exists substantial prior art information surrounding the innovation under scrutiny.
To capture this uncertainty, we denote by ￿ (respectively, 1 ￿ ￿) the unconditional probability
that the prior art related to the innovation is abundant (respectively, scarce).
We now detail each of the components of the model.
2.1 Search of Prior Art Information
Before ￿ling for a patent, the applicant decides the level of e⁄ort to devote to prior art search.
If he exerts an e⁄ort e he will ￿nd the amount of prior art x. To simplify, we assume that the
e⁄ort of the applicant generates a probability of ￿nding prior art e 2 [0;1] and has a disutility
equal to c(e) = e2=2.
The amount of prior art found by the applicant can take several values and depends both on
the underlying scarcity of prior art surrounding this particular innovation and the search e⁄ort
put forth by the applicant. We assume that the set of values is fx;xi;xg with 0 ￿ x < xi < x ￿ 1
and we normalize x = 0 and x = 1. The quantity of relevant prior art that is found depends
on how abundant the prior art surrounding the innovation is. When the prior art is abundant
8(respectively, scarce), the applicant ￿nds 1 (respectively, xi) with probability e, and in the course
of his search, he learns whether his innovation is patentable or not.11 This aspect underlies the
fact that a fair amount of learning about novelty takes place when applicants prepare their
applications (Trajtenberg et al., 2000). The discovery of the patentability is soft information
and, if necessary, its content might be omitted without altering the overall amount of prior
art submitted,12 even though this is against the law. Independent of whether the prior art is
abundant or scarce, with probability (1 ￿ e) the applicant discovers no information and learns
nothing about the patentability of his innovation. After having searched for prior art, he decides
to apply for a patent and to reveal e x in the application. In our game, e x is a message that can
take values in the set X = fx;xi;xg if the applicant found x and Xi = fx;xig if the applicant
found xi. In other words, the applicants can decide not to report some of the prior art he found
but he can never forge an application that would content more relevant prior art than he actually
found. Likewise, this aspect captures the possibility that applicants can withhold citations to
relevant prior art.
The examiner does not observe the e⁄ort of the applicant nor does she observe what he
actually found, she is just aware of the announced level of prior art e x when she receives a patent
application, and (eventually) updates her beliefs accordingly. She then makes a scrutiny e⁄ort
E 2 [0;1] to search for complementary information in order to be able to assess the patentability
of the innovation. We assume that if the application contains no prior art, it does not provide
enough information to be eligible for evaluation.13
The examination technology is simple. After exerting e⁄ort, the examiner receives a signal
that can only take two values: ￿patentable￿or ￿non patentable.￿The content of this signal is
the only information available to her.14
11We assume perfect learning by innovators but clearly all the model could be recast to allow this learning to
be interpreted as a simple ￿hint￿that some innovations are better than others. Similarly, one would obtain the
same qualitative results by relaxing this assumption and assuming instead that only a fraction of innovators learn
their type.
12Typically, the innovator can ￿nd a citation that may invalidate his patent or signi￿cantly reduce the scope of
his claims. He may simply remove this citation and pretend he never encountered it. This behavior is illegal and
might be prosecuted under the doctrine of inequitable conduct.
13This assumption simpli￿es the analysis. As will become clear later (see footnote 18), it can be relaxed without
a⁄ecting our results qualitatively.
14Literally, after exerting scrutiny e⁄ort, this search technology amounts to the examiner receiving a letter
9We assume that the informativeness of the signal received depends on the e⁄ort that the
examiner exerts. More precisely, the signal indicates the true nature of the innovation with
probability E, while with probability (1￿E), it is distributed according to the beliefs she holds
prior to receiving the signal. Formally, this technology implies that if the examiner believes
ex ante that a given application is patentable with probability ￿, then conditionally on the
innovation being patentable (good), the probability of rightly granting a patent is
P (Granting j good) = E + (1 ￿ E)￿;
whereas the probability of (incorrectly) refusing a patent to a good innovation is
P(Refusing j good) = (1 ￿ E)(1 ￿ ￿):
Note that for any strictly positive e⁄ort, the informativeness of the signal obtained will be higher
than her prior belief and thus, it is a strictly dominant strategy for the examiner to recommend
her signal whatever the belief held prior to search. As such, a higher scrutiny e⁄ort E results in
a good innovation being more often granted a patent and can, in the extreme, i.e., when E = 1,
result in a perfect sorting between patentable and non-patentable innovations.
The cost of the examiner￿ s search is
Ce x (E) = K
e x(1￿E); (1)
where e x 2 fxi;1g and K > 0. The rationale for this cost function goes as follows. If the
PTO wanted any potential innovation to be scrutinized with perfect accuracy, the cost would be
in￿nite. More importantly perhaps, the cost is a⁄ected by the relevant prior art, e x, transmitted
by the applicant. Clearly, an applicant endowed with a bad innovation can withhold citations to
relevant prior art as this lowers the number of information cues obtained by the examiner and
raises the overall cost of examination. All else being equal, the level of scrutiny is decreased and
dubious innovations are more likely to be patented. This ￿complementarity￿between the quality
of the information provided by the applicant and examiner e¢ ciency is arguably an important
aspect of this relationship.15
with a message reading ￿patentable￿or ￿non patentable.￿We thank an earlier anonymous referee for forcing to
precisely explain this point.
15In a survey of 4269 EPO examiners, Friebel et al. (2006) reports that 63% of them "say that high quality of
patent applications save a lot of their working time (p.112)."
10Our model allows for applications to di⁄er with respect to their informational content. Thus,
it seems important to wonder how the examiner should react given two di⁄erent applications.
One the one hand, every application should receive an equal scrutiny to guarantee fairness across
applicants. On the other hand, it seems rational to treat two applications di⁄erently when both
have the same social value but one is more costly to process than the other. We emphasize this
issue by considering three di⁄erent patenting processes:
i) The non commitment case ￿the examiner only responds to the information transmitted,
ii) the SPER ￿the examiner puts more emphasis on certain patents with scarce prior art, for
instance in emerging ￿elds,
iii) the commitment case ￿the examiner commits ex ante to certain levels of scrutiny e⁄orts.
To summarize, the timing of our game is the following:
￿ In cases i) and ii);
￿on date 1, the applicant decides how much e⁄ort e to put into prior art search. He
￿nds prior art information x and learns whether his innovation is patentable or not.
He then ￿les a patent application with announced prior art e x;
￿on date 2, the examiner observes the applicant￿ s announcement e x, and decides to
undertake search e⁄ort E;
￿on date 3, depending on the signal received during the examination, the examiner
decides whether or not to grant a patent.
￿ In case iii);
￿on date 1, the examiner ex ante commits to certain levels of scrutiny e⁄ort;
￿on date 2, knowing the levels of e⁄ort of the examiner, the applicant chooses his
search e⁄ort level e. He ￿nds x and learns whether his innovation is patentable or
not. He ￿les a patent application with announced prior art e x;
￿on date 3, the examiner grants or not a patent based on the announced information,
and the signal received during the examination process.
11In the rest of this section and the next, we focus on the commitment case (case i) where the
examiner responds to the information transmitted in the patent application. The structure of
examination technology in case of the SPER (case ii) and in the commitment case (case iii) will
be introduced in later sections.
2.2 Examination Technologies and Prior Art Search
We now present the structure of the patent examination technology, and the applicant￿ s prior
art search technology when the examiner does not commit to any scrutiny level of e⁄orts ex ante
(case i).
2.2.1 Patent Examination Technology
The examiner receives a patent application that contains e x. She ￿rst updates her beliefs and
then decides how much e⁄ort to put into checking the application. Her updated beliefs depend
crucially on her anticipation of the applicant￿ s behavior. More precisely, the examiner draws
some inference about validity by considering the amount of prior art reported in the application.
Note that if the applicant has an incentive to withhold prior art information, then a (rational)
examiner has no reason to believe that a given application has a probability p of being patentable.
Formally, ￿e x denotes the probability that the innovation is good, given that e x has been revealed
in the patent application. The maximization program of the examiner is
Max
E
[B(E;￿e x) ￿ Ce x (E)]; (2)
where her gross bene￿t is
B(E;￿e x) = ￿e x [E + (1 ￿ E)￿e x]WG + ￿e x (1 ￿ E)(1 ￿ ￿e x)WR (3)
+(1 ￿ ￿e x)[E + (1 ￿ E)(1 ￿ ￿e x)]WR + (1 ￿ ￿e x)(1 ￿ E)￿e xWG:
The gross bene￿t depends on the examiner￿ s e⁄ort E and on her updated beliefs ￿e x: The ￿rst
part of B(E;￿e x) represents the expected social value of a good innovation. With probability ￿e x;
the innovation is good. The examiner receives a signal indicating that the innovation is good
with probability E +(1￿E)￿e x and grants a patent to a good innovation; this generates a social
value WG. She refuses a patent to a good innovation with probability (1 ￿ E)(1 ￿ ￿e x) and
this generates a social value WR. The second part of the gross bene￿t represents the expected
12social value of a bad innovation. Indeed, with probability (1 ￿ ￿e x), the innovation is bad and
the examiner receives a corroborating signal with probability E +(1 ￿ E)(1 ￿ ￿e x) and refuses a
patent. This generates a social value WR. On the other hand, she receives a misleading signal
and wrongly grants a patent to a bad innovation with probability (1 ￿ E)￿e x; this is worth WG
to society.
To summarize, two types of errors can be made in the patent granting process with proba-
bility ￿e x (1 ￿ ￿e x)(1 ￿ E): either a type I error of refusing a patent to a good innovation, or a
type II error of wrongly granting a patent to a bad innovation.
The solution to the maximization program (2) with gross bene￿t (3) and cost (1), can be
written as
￿e x (1 ￿ ￿e x) e x￿W = K
(1￿E)2: (4)
Solving (4) with respect to E leads to the generic level of e⁄ort
E￿
e x = 1 ￿
h
K
￿e x(1￿￿e x)e x￿W
i 1
2 < 1; (5)
where e x 2 fxi;1g and K < ￿e x (1 ￿ ￿e x) e x￿W to insure interior solutions.
The examiner will exert a high level of scrutiny e⁄ort on a fraction E￿
e x > 0 of the applications
that contains e x, whereas a fraction (1 ￿ E￿
e x) will not be scrutinized as thoroughly. Moreover, a
higher level of relevant prior art will increase her scrutiny e⁄ort.
2.2.2 Applicant Prior Art Search
The applicant makes two sequential decisions: he ￿rst decides the level of e⁄ort to put in prior
art search and, second, the quantity of prior art to report to the examiner.
We ￿rst determine what the announcement of the applicant must be. After undertaking a
search e⁄ort, if he ￿nds xi or 1, he learns whether his innovation is patentable. For expositional
purposes, we call a good (respectively, bad) applicant an applicant who has learned that he has
a patentable (respectively, non-patentable) innovation.
As the applicant cannot report more than he actually found, if he gets no information he
reports nothing. If he ￿nds xi he can either report 0 or xi. However, there is no gain from
reporting 0, since in our setting, no patent is granted if the application does not contain prior
art. Therefore, whatever the patentability of the innovation, he should always report truthfully,
e x = xi.
13If the applicant ￿nds x = 1; he can announce either 0, xi or 1. Since announcing nothing is
a strictly dominated strategy, we still need to determine under what circumstances he reports
1 or xi. Although the bene￿t from withholding information appears to be clear, we have so
far neglected to introduce explicitly the costs associated with concealing prior art information.
In particular, recent studies show that the strength of a patent depends on whether prior art
has been concealed or not to obtain this patent. The di⁄erence in value of two otherwise
identical patents stems from the fact that it is much easier for competitors to invalidate a
patent on ￿forgotten￿prior art than on cited prior art (Allison and Lemley, 1998). To model
ex post punishment for non-compliance, we assume that the private value of the innovation
V = fV G;V Gg is negatively a⁄ected by prior art strategic concealment. More precisely, when
prior art is concealed, the value of the patented innovation is ￿V , with ￿ 2 (0;1). The parameter
￿ represents such things as the ability and the willingness of the PTO to establish an inequitable
conduct, it can also describe the applicant￿ s ability to legally ￿ght a patent litigation. In the
latter case, it has no reason to be identical across applicants and ￿ is interpreted as a ￿rm
speci￿c attribute.
If the applicant learns that his innovation is patentable, his expected gain is
Ee xV G + (1 ￿ Ee x)[￿e xV G + (1 ￿ ￿e x)V R];
where V R is the private value of a non-patented good innovation, Ee x is the e⁄ort performed by
the examiner conditional upon receiving e x, and ￿e x is the corresponding updated belief. Thus, a
good applicant who ￿nds the maximum amount of prior art reveals all of it if16
(E1 +(1￿E1)￿1)V G +(1￿E1)(1￿￿1)V R > (Ei +(1￿Ei)￿i)￿V G +(1￿Ei)(1￿￿i)V R: (6)
On the other hand, a bad applicant who has an expected gain (1 ￿ Ee x)￿e x￿V G, reports all his
￿ndings if
(1 ￿ E1)￿1 > (1 ￿ Ei)￿i￿: (7)
Inequalities (6) and (7) represent the conditions under which both types fully report their ￿nd-
ings.
Finally, the patent applicant must choose his e⁄ort level in searching for prior art, which is
16By a slight abuse of notation, we denote Exi by Ei and ￿xi by ￿i.
14the solution of
Max
e f￿(e) ￿ c(e)g;
where the gross bene￿t ￿(e) will be de￿ned in section 3.2.
3 Non Commitment Case: Equilibrium Outcomes
In this section, we begin by characterizing the applicant￿ s optimal transmission of information
after ￿nding prior art information and learning whether his innovation is good or bad, and we
derive the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Then, we determine the optimal search strategy of the
applicant.
3.1 Optimal Reporting Strategies
We consider ￿rst that no matter what he learned, the applicant reports what he found. The
updated beliefs of the examiner, consistent with this behavior, are
￿1 = Pr(good j e x = 1) =
p￿
p￿+(1￿p)￿ = p;
￿i = Pr(good j e x = xi) =
p(1￿￿)
p(1￿￿)+(1￿p)(1￿￿) = p;
Pr(good j e x = 0) = p;
where posterior beliefs are equal to prior beliefs.
The patent examiner chooses the optimal levels of e⁄ort depending on the transmitted in-
formation e x. When she observes e x, the ￿rst order condition (4) gives the optimal level of e⁄ort
E￿






where t stands for truthful and e x = fxi;1g. The e⁄ort levels E￿
1t and E￿
it are increasing (respec-
tively, decreasing) with the prior belief p, if p is smaller (respectively, higher) than 1=2. Beliefs
and e⁄ort levels are substitutes in the mind of the examiner. Therefore, starting from a prior be-
lief p < 1=2, the e⁄ort levels E￿
1t and E￿
it increase when the prior belief p becomes more ￿di⁄use￿
and approaches 1=2. When p ￿ 1=2 and increases further, the examiner chooses to devote less
e⁄ort to scrutiny and gives more weight to her priors when deciding to grant a patent. If there
exists an equilibrium in which both good and bad applicants report truthfully, then E￿
1t > E￿
it
for p 2 [p
i;pi] (all the proofs are relegated to the appendix). The intuition is straightforward.
15The examiner intensi￿es her scrutiny e⁄ort when she receives more information, as it is less
costly to do so.
We now de￿ne the equilibrium revelation strategy of the applicant, taking into account
the examiner￿ s level of scrutiny. A good applicant who ￿nds 1 has no incentive to transmit
less information. Indeed, knowing that his innovation is patentable, he is better-o⁄ fostering
the chance that the examiner will discover the exact type of his innovation.17 Formally, the
inequality (6) is always satis￿ed, as V G > V R. Indeed, if the inequality (6) is satis￿ed for ￿ = 1,
it is always satis￿ed for any ￿ < 1. On the other hand, a bad applicant who ￿nds 1 reports
truthfully if the inequality (7) is satis￿ed. Using (7), we de￿ne ￿1 such that









A bad applicant reports truthfully if ￿ ￿ ￿1. On the contrary, for any ￿ > ￿1, he conceals
information. In the latter case, the inequality (7) is never satis￿ed, since E￿
1t > E￿




it = 0 for p 2]p
1;p
i] [ [pi;p1[ (see appendix for p
1 and p1). Thus, when ￿ > ￿1,
inequality (7) is never satis￿ed for p 2]p
1;p1[, and there is no equilibrium in which the applicant
reports truthfully. When the cost of not revealing the truth (in term of reputation, or direct
sanction in the case of a lawsuit) increases, applicants are more likely to report truthfully. In
fact, in a system where it would be possible to perfectly enforce the duty of candor, applicants
would report all of the information they have. However, as explained in the introduction, the
PTO does not currently enforce this rule, and it is likely that in many cases the parameter ￿ is
large.
We posit our ￿rst set of ￿ndings, when the cost of concealing information is high.
Lemma 1 (candid applicants) If ￿ ￿ ￿1, it is optimal for the applicant to report truthfully.
The level of scrutiny exerted by the examiner depends on the amount of prior art transmitted e x.
She always exerts a higher level of scrutiny e⁄ort when she receives more prior art (E￿
1t > E￿
it)
for p 2 [p
i;pi]. Moreover, irrespective of the amount of prior art received, her e⁄ort is maximized
when p = 1=2.
17Again uncited prior art is a more e⁄ective tool for invalidating patents in court than cited prior art (Allison
and Lemley, 1998). In other words, when it is known that the innovation is novel, not including prior art could
result in a weaker patent if it is later litigated.
16The restriction on prior beliefs p 2 [p
i;pi], with 0 < p
i < 1=2 < pi < 1, insures interior
and strictly positive solutions E￿
1t and E￿
it to the maximization program (2). The intuition of
this result goes as follows. When the nature of the innovation is perceived as highly uncertain,
the examiner exerts a higher level of scrutiny irrespective of the amount of prior art received.
When the uncertainty is very low (i.e., for values of p close to 0 or to 1), she believes that the
innovation is either patentable or not, and it becomes too costly to exert a substantial scrutiny
e⁄ort. She then issues patents according to her prior beliefs.
When the cost of punishment for non-compliance is low, i.e., ￿ > ￿1, there exists no equi-
librium in pure strategies in which a bad applicant who ￿nds the full amount of prior art
reports truthfully when p 2]p
1;p1[ (these restrictions insure interior or null solutions). For val-
ues of p close to 0 or to 1, as the examiner makes no e⁄ort whatever the information received
(E￿
1t = E￿
it = 0), the applicant is indi⁄erent between revealing the truth or not. If we assume
that the applicant always reveals the truth when he is indi⁄erent, we have an equilibrium in
which the applicant reports truthfully and the examiner makes no complementary e⁄ort. This
is only true when there is almost no uncertainty.
In our setting, the inexistence of an equilibrium in pure strategies is akin to an audit without
commitment (Khalil, 1997). When the patent examiner assumes that applicants report honestly,
she exerts a higher scrutiny e⁄ort when the prior art is more abundant, i.e., E￿
1t > E￿
it. Hence,
bad applicants will not comply. Conversely, non-compliance is not an equilibrium either since
abundant prior art means a patentable innovation for sure, and the examiner should not exert
any scrutiny (see appendix for the proof on the non-existence of equilibrium).
We summarize these ￿ndings in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If ￿ > ￿1, there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies when (p;￿) 2 ￿l.
When it is not costly to conceal information, applicants have no incentives to always report
truthfully or to always lie, but they can sometimes report truthfully. Therefore, we consider
a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which a bad applicant randomizes his report decision. We
let ￿ denote the probability that a bad applicant who ￿nds the full amount of prior art reports
truthfully, e x = 1, and conceals information with the complementary probability, (1 ￿ ￿).
When the examiner receives a patent application containing e x = 1, it either originates from
a good or a bad applicant. When she receives a patent application containing e x = xi, it can
17come from a good or a bad applicant who has discovered the intermediate level, but also from
a bad applicant who has found x = 1 but has concealed some information. However, it cannot
come from a good applicant who has found x = 1.
The updated beliefs of the examiner consistent with randomization are





￿i(￿) = Pr(good j e x = xi) =
p(1￿￿)
1￿￿+(1￿￿)(1￿p)￿;
Pr(good j e x = 0) = p:
(9)
In this equilibrium, a bad applicant must be indi⁄erent between revealing the full amount
of prior art and getting ￿1(1 ￿ E1)V G, and revealing the intermediate level and getting ￿i(1 ￿
Ei)￿V G. Thus, there exists a value of ￿ that must satisfy





where ￿￿ 2 [0;1].18
We can posit the following result.
Proposition 1 (prior art concealment) If ￿ > ￿1, whenever the equilibrium e⁄ort levels of
the examiner are such that E1 > Ei, there exists a unique probability ￿￿ de￿ned by (11) with
which a bad applicant discloses the full amount of prior art. This probability decreases with p;
￿; and E1, and increases with ￿, and Ei and V G.
This ￿nding emphasizes the main strategic tension faced by an applicant who has discovered
that his innovation is non-patentable. The probability ￿￿ measures applicant￿ s level of candor.
18It seems in order to discuss now what would happen if we allow the applicant to patent without reporting any
prior art. The ￿rst consequence is that it would de facto enrich the possibilities for strategic concealment. An
applicant with x can now choose to report xi with probability ￿i but also x with probability ￿x . He is truthful
with probability 1 ￿ ￿i ￿ ￿x. Similarly, an applicant with xi would be able to report x with probability ￿. This





taking into account ￿ chosen by applicant ￿x￿and vice versa). However, the logic of
strategic reporting (i.e., the use mixed strategies) would carry over to this more complicated framework; applicants
would continue to conceal prior art.
18The e⁄ects are straightforward. First, when the value of a patented innovation, V G; increases
the applicant tends to transmit more prior art. Also, the lower the cost ￿, the higher ￿￿. In
fact, when it becomes too costly to report strategically, ￿￿ = 1, which corresponds to an equi-
librium with truthful revelation of information. As argued in the introduction, these results are
consistent with empirical ￿ndings by Lampe (2008); applicants do withhold citations to relevant
prior art. However, the expression of ￿￿ also reveals that applicants take examiners￿behavior
into account when deciding to withhold information. For instance, when the examiner increases
her scrutiny e⁄ort conditional on obtaining abundant prior art, a bad applicant tends to report
less prior art in his application. Conversely, when the examiner focuses more on applications
with less prior art (E￿
i higher), the applicant will transmit more information. Together, these
e⁄ects suggest that to avoid strategic reporting, the examiner might commit to identical screen-
ing intensity, irrespective of the information provided by the applicant (the commitment case is
developed in section 5).
We now determine the optimal levels of examiner e⁄ort and show that it is an equilibrium.
Before turning to the description of the objective functions of the examiner, it is worth describing
her equilibrium beliefs. We use the probability that the applicant announces the full amount of
prior art ￿￿ to de￿ne the updated beliefs of the examiner. By replacing ￿￿, as de￿ned by (11)




(1￿E1) > p; (12)




(1￿Ei)￿ < p; (13)
when the intermediate amount has been revealed by the applicant. Thus, when the examiner
knows that there is some prior art concealment, she can no longer hold a uniform belief p across
all applications in equilibrium.
The equilibrium e⁄orts of the examiner account for the applicant￿ s strategic behavior. The










19when she receives e x = xi.19
In this setting, the e⁄ort levels of the examiner when she receives the full or intermediate
levels of prior art are no longer independent. The level of e⁄ort E1 is found by solving equation
(14) using the equilibrium prior ￿￿
1 and the randomization parameter ￿￿:
E￿







A further consideration of expression (16) shows that an increase in Ei simply decreases E￿
1.
We also obtain the level of e⁄ort Ei as a function of E1 using (15), ￿￿
1, and the randomization
parameter ￿￿,
E￿







The derivative of E￿
i (:) with respect to E1 is also negative.
Without putting more restrictions on the parameters, by using the reaction functions (16)
and (17), it is not possible to obtain a general explicit expression for the equilibrium levels E￿
i
and E￿
1. However, we can state the following proposition that holds for interior solutions.
Proposition 2 If ￿ > ￿1, there exists a semi-separating equilibrium in which a bad applicant
randomizes his revelation, whereas a good applicant always reports truthfully. Furthermore, the
level of scrutiny e⁄ort exerted by the examiner after receiving a patent application with all the
relevant prior art is higher than after receiving a patent application that contains the intermediate
level, that is, E￿
1 > E￿
i for (￿;p) 2 ￿.
There exists an equilibrium in which a bad applicant who ￿nds x = 1 randomizes his reporting
decision. In this case, the examiner intensi￿es her complementary search when she receives more
prior art for (￿;p) 2 ￿, which insures interior solutions.
To simplify, and in order to get analytical solutions, we assume that it is socially as bene￿cial
to grant a patent on a good innovation as to refuse one on a bad innovation (i.e., WG =
WR). Although this assumption may not be empirically sound, it allows us to obtain analytical
expressions for optimal e⁄orts without altering our (qualitative) results. We ￿nd the following
optimal e⁄orts:
E￿







19See appendix for the second order condition.
20and
E￿







The comparison of these e⁄orts con￿rms that E￿
1 > E￿
i when the type and the ￿eld of innovation
are highly uncertain (for (p;￿) 2 ￿; where ￿ is de￿ned in the appendix).
As we obtain explicit solutions for the optimal levels of e⁄ort, we can make some comparative
statics. Some of these ￿ndings are derived in the general case, as well.
Corollary 1 If ￿ > ￿1, WG = WR and holding everything else constant,
￿ E￿
1 is strictly increasing with p; and E￿
i is increasing (respectively, decreasing) with p for
(p;￿) 2 ￿ (respectively, for (p;￿) = 2 ￿),
￿ E￿
1 is decreasing (respectively, increasing) with ￿ for p 2 [xi=(1 + xi);1] (respectively,
for p 2 [0;xi=(1 + xi)]), and E￿
i is decreasing (respectively, increasing) with ￿ for p 2
[0;1=(1 + xi)] (respectively, for p 2 [1=(1 + xi);1]).
The logic goes as follows. Let us start at the highest level of uncertainty concerning both
the value of the innovation and the ￿eld to which it belongs (i.e., p and ￿ belong to a closed
set containing 1=2). For a given ￿, both levels of e⁄ort increase with the probability of a good
innovation p. The examiner is willing to put in more e⁄ort to make her judgment more accurate
when she believes the innovation is worthwhile. However, after p reaches a certain threshold as
it becomes even more likely that the innovation is good, and because of the strategic report from
some applicants, the examiner makes less e⁄ort when she receives less information. Indeed, she
prefers to concentrate on applications that contain more information.
For a given p close to 1=2, as ￿ increases, both levels of e⁄ort decrease. The higher the
probability that the innovation belongs to a mature ￿eld, the greater the chances the applicant
will ￿nd relevant prior art. Therefore, because of the complementarity between the applicant
and examiner e⁄orts, she will reduce the intensity of her scrutiny. The e⁄ect is identical on both
e⁄orts, as the uncertainty about the value of the innovation is at its highest. For a given p small
enough, the examiner intensi￿es her search e⁄ort when she receives full information, but reduces
it when she receives intermediate information. Because it is more likely that the innovation is
bad, it is expected that there will be more strategic reports from bad applicants. Therefore,
the examiner will intensify her scrutiny e⁄ort when she receives more information to make a
21more accurate scrutiny, since she receives fewer applications with the full amount of information.
Lastly, for a given p high enough, the converse will arise: as ￿ increases, the examiner reduces
her search e⁄ort when she receives the full amount, and intensi￿es it otherwise. In this case, it
is more likely that the innovation is good and, therefore, fewer strategic reports will be made by
bad applicants.
We can also state the following results.
Corollary 2 If ￿ > ￿1, WG = WR and holding everything else constant,
￿ E￿
1 is increasing with ￿W and ￿; and decreasing with K and xi.
￿ E￿
i is increasing with ￿W and xi; and decreasing with K and ￿.
The higher the social gain from avoiding mistakes (i.e., ￿W), the higher the scrutiny e⁄orts of
the examiner. She intensi￿es her scrutiny e⁄ort when the stakes are higher. Not surprisingly, the
higher K, the lower the scrutiny e⁄orts. When it is more costly to search, the examiner cannot
put too much e⁄ort into each application. The higher the intermediate amount of information xi,
the lower (higher) the scrutiny e⁄ort when she receives more (less) information. If she receives
more information in the emerging ￿eld case (i.e., the emerging ￿eld becomes more mature), she
will intensify her scrutiny e⁄ort and E￿
i becomes closer to E￿
1.
As it becomes more costly to conceal information (i.e., ￿ decreases), a bad applicant has
less incentive to report strategically ((1￿￿￿) decreases), and the updated belief of the examiner
when she receives e x = 1 decreases. This triggers the examiner to reduce her scrutiny e⁄ort, as
more bad applicants will now ￿le a patent application with e x = 1. On the other hand, as ￿
decreases, the updated belief of the examiner when she receives e x = xi increases, as less strategic
reporting will occur. She then intensi￿es her scrutiny e⁄ort when she receives xi.
As a last point, we comment on an argument made by Lemley (2001) that the PTO should
not be too worried if undeserved patents are granted. If we consider that it is, in the end, not
too costly to grant bad patents, we posit the following result:
Corollary 3 Assume that there is a social loss in granting a patent to a non-patentable inno-
vation, that is WG < 0. If this loss becomes smaller, the examiner should exert less scrutiny
e⁄ort.
22When the social loss of granting a bad patent WG becomes smaller, the examiner should
optimally rely more on her prior beliefs and less on an informed decision (E small). This
intuitive result of our model replicates the argument made by Lemley (2001), mentioned above.
Nevertheless, this argument hinges on the assumption that WG is small, which remains an open
question (Farrell and Merges, 2004). We now turn to the applicant￿ s decision to search for prior
art.
3.2 Search of Prior Art by the Applicant
It is often claimed that patent applicants do not have incentives to search for prior art. It is
true that the current system does not seem to give much incentive for prior art search. The
observation of the (low) amount of prior art reported in applications actually tend to con￿rm
that applicants do not search for prior art. But is this really true?
From the previous section, we can state that the prior art found is ￿not equal￿to the prior
art reported by applicants. Thus, the scarcity of prior art reported in applications should not
be taken as prima facie evidence that applicants do not search for prior art. In particular,
when the cost of not reporting prior art decreases (i.e., ￿ increases), search tends to bring only
bene￿ts; the applicant gains a better knowledge regarding patentability but at the same time
keeps his option not to reveal what he found. This suggests that when ￿ is high, more search
will be associated with higher chances to be granted a patent. The rest of the section analyzes
the applicant￿ s problem and makes these arguments more palatable.
The applicant￿ s ￿rst decision is to search for prior art information. While making his search
decision, the applicant can correctly infer the issue of the game and, therefore, his optimal report
and the examiner￿ s optimal e⁄orts.
For ￿ > ￿1, the gross bene￿t function of the applicant is
￿(e) = ef￿p
￿
(E1 + (1 ￿ E1)￿1)V G + (1 ￿ E1)(1 ￿ ￿1)V R)
￿
+ ￿(1 ￿ p)￿(1 ￿ E1)￿1V G
+￿(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ Ei)￿i￿V G + (1 ￿ ￿)p[(Ei + (1 ￿ Ei)￿i)V G
+(1 ￿ Ei)(1 ￿ ￿i)V R)] + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ Ei)￿iV Gg + (1 ￿ e)pV R:
His e⁄ort generates a probability e of ￿nding prior art. After making an e⁄ort e, with
probability (1￿e) he does not ￿nd any prior art and does not ￿le for a patent application. If his
innovation is good, he nevertheless gets a positive bene￿t V R. Otherwise, with complementary
23probability e, he ￿nds 1 with probability ￿ if prior art is abundant but only xi if prior art is
scarce (with probability 1￿￿). In the former case, with probability p, the innovation is good and
it is granted a patent with probability E1 + (1 ￿ E1)￿1 but (wrongly) rejected with probability
(1 ￿ E1)(1 ￿ ￿1). A non patentable innovation with abundant prior art is submitted without
concealment with probability ￿ and it is granted a patent with probability (1 ￿ E1)￿1. The
applicant can, with probability 1 ￿ ￿, submit it fewer prior art than found (e x = xi) and get a
patent with probability (1￿Ei)￿i. In the latter case, that is if xi was found, a good innovation is
awarded a patent with probability Ei+(1￿Ei)￿i and rejected with probability (1￿Ei)(1 ￿ ￿i):
Finally, a bad innovation with xi goes through the screening process with probability (1￿Ei)￿i.
From the maximization program of the applicant
Max
e f￿(e) ￿ c(e)g;
we derive the e⁄ort
e￿(￿) = Min f1;e1(￿) ￿ ￿(￿)g; (20)
where
e1(￿) = p(1 ￿ p)[￿E￿
1 (￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)E￿
i (￿)]￿V + p2￿V + pV G (21)
and








(p￿V + V G): (22)
As ￿￿ < 1 and ￿V = V G ￿ V G ￿ V R, it follows that ￿(￿) > 0.
The optimal e⁄ort can be decomposed into the two expressions e1(￿) and ￿(￿). The ￿rst
expression, e1(￿), which represents the baseline search incentives, is increasing with the overall
e⁄ort expanded by the examiner. This arises because when examiners increase their e⁄ort,
they more likely identify and grant patents to good innovations (i.e., those who have a strictly
higher value patented than not). Therefore, if screening is expected to increase, it creates more
incentives to search for applicants. The expression ￿(￿) represents the strategic component of
the search e⁄ort, it a⁄ects the applicant￿ s e⁄ort negatively. A decrease in ￿ results in a loss
(i.e., (1 ￿ ￿) increases) since prior art concealment is more costly. It is compounded with a
lower probability that a (bad) innovation is granted a patent when it is misrepresented; the
term 1 ￿ E￿
i ￿ (1 ￿ E￿
1)=￿ represents the di⁄erence in errors across ￿elds. When ￿ decreases
24further this di⁄erence vanishes as strategic concealment is no longer attractive. This suggests
that the curve of ￿(￿) has an inverted U-shape.
If ￿ = 1, the second term disappears as ￿(1) = 0 and, therefore, e￿(1) = e1(1) = p(1 ￿
p)(￿E￿
1 (1) + (1 ￿ ￿)E￿
i (1))￿V + p2￿V + pV G.
The next result presents how search incentives are a⁄ected when ￿ varies.
Lemma 3 If ￿ > ￿1, the optimal e⁄ort level e￿(:) is a convex function of ￿. Moreover, when
￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿3
￿3+xi and ￿ is close to 1,
@￿(￿)
@￿ > 0:
The convexity is essentially driven by the shape of the cost function of strategic reporting
(22): it is low when ￿ is close to 1 (i.e., the ￿rst term of (22) is small) or when there is no incentive
to report strategically (i.e., when E￿
1 is close enough to E￿
i and the second term of (22) is small).
The search e⁄ort is thus maximized either when ￿ is large (maximum strategic reporting) or
when ￿ is small (no strategic reporting). The second part of the lemma simply illustrates that
a high level of impunity (￿ high) is in fact often associated with strong marginal incentives to
search. Note that a necessary condition for this result to hold is that ￿ ￿ ￿1. Indeed, when
prior art is abundant overall (￿ large), the examiner is biased against applications with low
prior art content; the examiner does not ignore strategic concealment and applications with few
prior art tend to be suspicious in the examiner￿ s mind. As a result, strategic concealment is less
attractive and this reduces innovator￿ s incentives to search for prior art ex ante.
For ￿ ￿ ￿1, the gross bene￿t function of the applicant does not account for any strategic
report,
￿(e) = e[￿p((E1 + (1 ￿ E1)p)V G + (1 ￿ E1)(1 ￿ p)V R)) + ￿(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ E1)pV G
+(1 ￿ ￿)p((Ei + (1 ￿ Ei)p)V G + (1 ￿ Ei)(1 ￿ p)V R)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ Ei)pV G]
+(1 ￿ e)pV R;
and, therefore, the optimal level of e⁄ort for the applicant is
e￿
t = p(1 ￿ p)[￿E￿
1t + (1 ￿ ￿)E￿
it]￿V + p2￿V + pV G: (23)
The expression (23) is identical to (21) but, not surprisingly perhaps, the strategic component
(22) has disappeared. Similar to the case with strategic concealment, an increase in the relative
value of a patented innovation ￿V tends to enhance incentives to search for prior art but clearly
25the applicant￿ s e⁄ort no longer depends on ￿. Further, the e⁄ort of the applicant is sensitive to
examiner e⁄orts, as @e￿=@E￿
j > 0 for j = 1;i. The greater the e⁄orts of the examiner, the more
e⁄ort the applicant will put into his search for relevant prior art. This result again emphasizes
the link between examiner and applicant search e⁄orts.
The applicant￿ s e⁄ort also varies with the amount of intermediate prior art that he can ￿nd,
xi, with the probability of having a good innovation, p, and the probability of abundant prior
art, ￿. To see how a change in these parameters a⁄ects the e⁄ort of the applicant, we need to
di⁄erentiate equation (20) with respect to these variables, taking into account that examiner
e⁄orts will also vary with them. For instance, an increase in xi induces the examiner to intensify
her research e⁄ort E￿
i , whereas she devotes less e⁄ort to search for complementary prior art
when she has received the full amount of prior art, @E￿
1=@xi < 0: Thus, there are two e⁄ects
that work in opposite directions. On the one hand, if the intermediate level of prior art increases
due to an increase in the examiner￿ s e⁄ort, the applicant intensi￿es his e⁄ort. But on the other
hand, due to the decrease in the examiner￿ s e⁄ort if 1 is reported, the applicant reduces his
e⁄ort. It is not clear which e⁄ect is greater than the other, and we cannot conclude.
We summarize these ￿ndings in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 If ￿ ￿ ￿1 and holding everything else constant, the e⁄ort of the applicant e￿
t
￿ Increases with ￿ and ￿V:
￿ increases with optimal levels of e⁄ort of the PTO examiner.
Finally, we need to o⁄er some comparison of the search e⁄ort exerted when the applicant is
truthful and strategic.
Lemma 5 If p > 1
1+xi, then e￿(1) > e￿
t for any ￿ 2 (0;1):
This su¢ cient condition, which is (much) stronger than necessary, o⁄ers the simple illus-
tration that when prior art concealment is not costly (￿ = 1), search has strategic value and
applicants can actually search more than if they were induced to be truthful. Thus, in certain
circumstances applicants are likely to know well all the prior art related to their innovation.
Patent regulators can use this to their advantage. For instance, a possible way to elicit this
26information is to favor open review procedures where competitors can challenge patents prior
to their issuance by submitting prior art references.20
In the next two sections, we study two possible solutions for remedying prior art concealment.
4 Second Pair of Eyes Review
In March 2000, in reaction to numerous quality-related criticisms about the granting of business-
method patents (main class 705), the PTO began a quality patent improvement initiative involv-
ing several measures, such as the hiring of additional, better-trained examiners, the obligation
for them to consult non-patent prior art information sources and, perhaps most importantly, a
second-level examination applied only to patents granted within the main 705 classi￿cation. The
e⁄ects of this initiative, called the ￿Second Pair of Eyes Review,￿have been empirically studied
in Allison and Hunter (2006). They ￿rst argue that an applicant endowed with a business-
method innovation has substantial latitude to choose whether to submit it in the main class
(705) or in other main classes related to business methods (i.e., with secondary 705 classi￿ca-
tion). Then, they empirically analyze the composition of patent applications before and after
the SPER initiative.
We develop a simple variant of our model that incorporates the Second Pair of Eyes Review
(SPER) to investigate its impact on the patenting process and the behavior of applicants. We
model the SPER initiative by allowing for a second review of awarded patents when prior art is
scarce. In our context, innovations can be thought to belong to two technologically related ￿elds
of innovation. In one of them, there is less prior art to be found and, at the cost of strategic
drafting, applicants can ￿opt out￿the ￿eld where there is abundant prior art (see footnote 5). To
simplify the analysis, we assume that when a patent is granted to a good innovation the second
review does not invalidate it, whereas it eliminates a fraction ￿ 2 [0;1] of wrongly patented
innovations during the ￿rst review. In this setup, a bad applicant who anticipates the second
20Interestingly, the PTO has recently opened the patent examination process to third parties.
Any party can submit related prior art online through a pilot program called ￿Peer-to-Patent￿
(http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent accessed on 05/25/2209). In Europe, open review procedures are one
building block of the patenting process (Friebel, et al., 2006).
27review chooses ￿ such that
￿1(￿)(1 ￿ E1) = ￿i(￿)(1 ￿ Ei)(1 ￿ ￿)￿:





Note that although ￿ can take any value between 0 and 1, any ￿ ￿ ￿ where ￿ = 1 ￿ (1 ￿
E1)=[(1 ￿ Ei)￿] induces ￿￿






SPER 2 [￿￿;1]. It is straightforward to show that ￿￿
SPER increases with ￿, so that an increase
in the precision in the second review reduces the strategic concealment of information.
If WG = WR and ￿ > ￿1, the equilibrium e⁄orts of the examiner under the SPER regime
are
ESPER














where ￿WSPER = WG ￿ WR + (1 ￿ ￿)(WR ￿ WG).
A comparison of the e⁄ort levels leads to the following ￿ndings.
Lemma 6 If ￿ > ￿1, as ￿ increases, the examiner reduces her scrutiny e⁄ort when she receives
the full amount of prior art, whereas she increases her e⁄ort when she receives the intermediate
amount. Furthermore, she exerts more e⁄ort when she receives more information, ESPER
1 >
ESPER
i for ￿ < ￿.
The implementation of the SPER initiative reduces the strategic reporting of information
by allowing the examiner to intensify her search e⁄ort when she receives xi and to reduce it
whenever she gets more information.
For the sake of simplicity, we do not take into account the cost of implementing the SPER
policy. In fact, introducing a second examination should be more costly to the PTO. However,
the introduction of such cost would make our model intractable and would not change the ￿ avor
of the results. Indeed, our ￿ndings would be more dramatic, as it would make the screening of
patents with abundant prior art costly and, therefore, would reduce the examiner￿ s e⁄orts when
prior art is abundant.
28To analyze the e⁄ects of the SPER initiative on patents, we compare the number of patent
applications and granted patents for each type of application, as well as their quality, before and
after the implementation of the SPER initiative. Our ￿ndings are summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 If ￿ > ￿1, for any ￿ > 0, the implementation of the SPER initiative has the
following e⁄ects:
1. Fewer patent applications with low prior art content are scrutinized;
2. More patent applications with high prior art content are scrutinized;
3. Fewer patents with abundant prior art are granted;
4. The ratio of good patented innovations over all patented innovations decreases (respectively,
increases) for applications with abundant prior art (respectively, scarce prior art).
These ￿ndings lead us to propose several potential testable assumptions for a reform in
the spirit of SPER. Some of these hypotheses have already been explored in Allison and Hunter
(2006). For instance, they show that there is a sharp decrease in the proportion of main-class 705
patents relative to the total class 705 patents (i.e., main plus secondary) in the years following
the implementation of the SPER initiative.21They also show that the number of patents granted
in the main 705 classi￿cation increased substantially after the implementation of the SPER
initiative. Finally, they analyze the content of several patents granted in secondary class 705
and show that an unusual proportion of them would potentially fall in the main 705 patent
category.22
We also consider the e⁄ect of the SPER initiative on the e⁄ort of the applicant, as derived
in the previous section. For the applicant, e⁄orts in both type of application are important in
determining his incentives to search for prior art. Thus, as evidenced by equations (16) and
(17), any reform that increases the search e⁄ort of examiners in one ￿eld is likely to decrease
21This is also true in our model.
22Unfortunately, the authors do not have data on validity to test whether, as suggested by our model, these
patents are of inferior quality.
29the search e⁄ort in another ￿eld (provided applicants engage in strategic drafting). From a
theoretical standpoint, the e⁄ect on applicant search e⁄orts is unclear. At the least, we expect
applicants￿e⁄orts to change when such a reform is introduced. This would be consistent with
other ￿ndings of Allison and Hunter (2006), that after SPER, the amount of prior art disclosed in
patent applications is signi￿cantly higher in the main 705 classi￿cation, and also in patents with
secondary 705 classi￿cation. In our model, rather than the amount of prior art discovered per
patent, an increase in examiner e⁄ort increases the fraction of innovations for which substantial
prior art is discovered; that is, there are more patents with x 2 fxi;1g than patents with no
prior art.23
5 Ex ante commitment of the PTO
In the previous sections, we have assumed that the examiner is passive in the sense that her
scrutiny level is a (optimal) response to every application she receives. While this may be
realistic in many cases, we need to look at the opposite case where the representative examiner
commits to speci￿c levels of scrutiny that are contingent on the prior art reported. In other
words, we are analyzing a situation in which the PTO assumes ￿leadership￿with an ex ante
commitment policy where applicants search e⁄ort and concealment strategy are now responses
to this commitment.
We denote by E1c and Eic the levels of e⁄ort of the examiner when, respectively, the full
amount and the intermediate amount of prior art are provided and, to simplify, we assume that
concealment is costless (￿ = 1). Two qualitatively di⁄erent cases must be considered: whether
Eic ￿ E1c or Eic < E1c.
We ￿rst consider the case where Eic < E1c. By ￿nding the full amount of prior art, the
applicant learns the type of his innovation. Therefore, a good applicant will report all prior art,
whereas a bad applicant may decide to transmit only the intermediate amount. The next result
is the ￿rst step in ￿nding the optimal commitment policy of the PTO.
Lemma 7 It is always possible to ￿nd a policy that strictly dominates a policy in which the
examiner ex ante commits to levels of scrutiny (Eic;E1c) such that Eic < E1c:
23In our model, for instance, we could assume that an increase in e also increases the quantities xi and x:
30A policy that involves Eic < E1c has two major drawbacks. First, it is cost-dominated by
another policy with a lower gap between E1c and Eic (see appendix). Intuitively, reducing E1c
does not change the optimal reporting strategy (all applicants optimally conceal prior art) but
it reduces scrutiny costs. A more subtle problem with such a policy is that the commitment
problem of the examiner is very intense when Eic < E1c simply because the gains of reneging on
her commitment are high. Indeed, in this context, the examiner would gain C(E1c) monetary
units by reneging on her commitment, without altering the quality of screening.
The commitment policy involving Eic ￿ E1c induces truthful revelation of information.
However, the underlying commitment problem alluded above is much less intense. Indeed, in
a truthtelling equilibrium, it is certain that (Eic;E1c) are ex post ine¢ cient but the gains from
reneging on her commitment (i.e., switching to E￿
1t and E￿
it) are much lower. Thus, compared
to the case Eic < E1c, the examiner faces a low-intensity commitment problem when Eic ￿ E1c.
We now proceed to the analysis of this case.
When E1c = Eic, the applicant who learns the nature of his innovation is indi⁄erent between
reporting e x = 1 (truthful reporting) and reporting only part of the found prior art (strategic
reporting). For de￿nitiveness, we make the assumption that when the applicant is indi⁄erent,
he reports truthfully. Given that the applicant is induced to be truthful, and if the applicant
reports some prior art information, the gross bene￿t function of the examiner is
Bc (E1c;Eic) = ￿B(E1c;p) + (1 ￿ ￿)B(Eic;p);
where c stands for commitment, and B(Ejc;p) for j = 1;i is de￿ned by equation (3).
The ex ante commitment policy inducing information search and truthful revelation by the
applicant is the solution of the following program:
max
E1c;Eic
fe(E1c;Eic)[Bc (E1c;Eic) ￿ ￿ K
(1￿E1c) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) K
xi(1￿Eic)]g;
subject to
E1c ￿ Eic: (26)
The next result simpli￿es the analysis of the examiner￿ s program when she wants to induce
truthful reports.
Proposition 4 If the examiner wants to induce truthful reports, the unique optimal commitment
policy is such that E1c = Eic.
31We know that, if they exist, the ex post e¢ cient levels of e⁄ort are such that E￿
1 > E￿
i .
By committing to levels of e⁄ort ex ante, the PTO would like to reduce ex post ine¢ ciencies
as much as possible. More precisely, the examiner would like to raise E1c as much as possible.
Therefore, among all of the possible levels of e⁄ort that satisfy E1c ￿ Eic, those that minimize
ex post ine¢ ciency are such that E1c = Eic = Ec.









e(Ec) = p[￿V (1 ￿ p)Ec + p￿V + V G]
and B(E1c;p) = B(Eic;p) = B(Ec;p); thus,
Bc (Ec) = ￿p(1 ￿ p)￿W(1 ￿ Ec) + p(WG ￿ WR) + WR:
We cannot obtain an analytical solution due to the complexity of the ex ante program.
However, we can state the following result.
Corollary 4 The applicant increases his search e⁄ort in the commitment case, i.e., e(Ec) > e￿
t.
The levels of e⁄ort of the examiner when they are performed ex post generate too few
incentives on the part of the applicants. By committing to e⁄ort ex ante, the patent examiner
can threaten to lower the applicant￿ s bene￿t. The applicant is thus led to increase his search of
prior art. The commitment thus helps the examiner to shift, to some extent, the burden of the
information search to applicants.
The comparison between the optimal e⁄orts in the commitment case and in the non-commitment
case leads to E￿
i < Ec < E￿
1 when the uncertainty about the value of the innovation and the
￿eld it belongs to is the highest, i.e., for some constellation of parameters (p;￿) (see appendix).
The commitment case allows the patent examiner to intensify (respectively, reduce) her search
e⁄ort when she receives less (respectively, more) prior art, because there is no longer strategic
revelation of information.
When there is an ex ante commitment policy, the ratio of good patented innovations patents
over all patented innovations is the same across all type of applications while, obviously, when
there is no commitment, the quality is not homogenous across all type of applications.
326 Conclusion
Patent examiners must assess the patentability of an innovation by comparing the application
to related information that is already in the public domain, called prior art information. When
the initial application contains little prior art information, and when the prior art is not easily
accessible to examiners, it may be di¢ cult to judge the novel content of an innovation. Prior art
information may be more di¢ cult for examiners to gather when the innovation belongs to an
emerging technological ￿eld and much of the prior art is non-patent information. Sampat (2009)
shows that patent examiners￿abilities to locate prior art embodied in U.S. patents exceed their
ability to locate other types of prior art (non-patent). Therefore, if most of the prior art is not
related to U.S. patents, examiners may be unable to assess the patentability of an innovation.
This, in turn, may lead to a reduction in patent quality, as more questionable patents are issued.
In the current U.S. patent system, while applying for a patent, an applicant is supposed to
disclose the prior art information of which he is aware, but is not required to search for more
prior art. Thus, applicants have little incentive to reveal the information they have and to search
for more.
We analyze the issues related to the gathering of prior art information. In our setting,
applicants decide to apply for patent protection after gaining private information about the
value of their innovation. Their decisions depend both on the private information they gather
and the patent policy adopted by the PTO. After receiving an application, the patent examiner
undertakes a costly search e⁄ort that depends on her beliefs about the value of the innovation.
To be as realistic as possible, we allow the examiner to make two kinds of mistakes: to refuse a
patent on a good innovation and to grant a patent to a bad innovation.
We consider di⁄erent policies: one in which the PTO cannot commit to any search e⁄ort,
one in which there is a second review for certain type of application, and one in which the
examiner ex ante commits to a screening intensity. In the former case, an applicant who has
learned he has a non-patentable innovation might conceal some information from the examiner
to increase his probability of being granted a patent. The optimal policy of the examiner is to
intensify her scrutiny e⁄ort when she receives more prior art. Therefore, she devotes more e⁄ort
to those applications that are more likely to come from good applicants. In the second case,
the introduction of a more thorough screening when prior art is scarce reduces the strategic
33non-revelation of information, but its overall success remains unclear. Indeed, the imposition
of a stricter screening when prior art is scarce may improve the quality of patents in this ￿eld,
but will negatively a⁄ect the quality of patents in another ￿eld. We then go further into our
investigation of policy remedies, and, in the latter case, we show that by ex ante committing to
the same screening e⁄ort across all types of application, the examiner induces truthful revelation
of information.
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37Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We ￿rst determine for which values of prior beliefs the examiner makes a complementary








for e x = xi;1 are ￿rst increasing and then decreasing with p. As the second derivative is negative,
the bene￿t function is concave and reaches a maximum for p = 1=2 (the last part of Lemma 1 is
proved). We now de￿ne for what values of p the e⁄orts are such that E￿
e xt(p) = 0. These values
belong to the interval [0;1] as the limits of E￿
e xt(p) are ￿1 when p tends toward 0 or 1, and are
p
e x =









if K < e x￿W=4. It is easy to verify that p
1 < p
i < 1
2 < pi < p1 where p
i ￿ p
xi and pi ￿ pxi.
Hence, for values of p 2]0;p




i;p1[, she does not make any e⁄ort after receiving xi, but makes the e⁄ort E￿
1t > 0
after receiving e x = 1. And ￿nally, for values of p 2]p
i;pi[, she makes e⁄orts E￿
1t and E￿
it. It is
straightforward to show that E￿
1t > E￿
it, as xi < 1.
Proof of Lemma 2: No equilibrium in pure strategies for ￿ > ￿1
Another pure strategy to consider is the one in which the same applicant always conceals
part of the prior art found and reveals only an intermediate amount. To see whether this can
be an equilibrium, we need to compute the updated beliefs of the PTO.
Consider ￿rst that the PTO believes that a bad applicant who ￿nds x = 1 always conceals
some information. The set of beliefs consistent with this behavior is computed as
￿1 = Pr(good j e x = 1) =
p￿
p￿ = 1;
￿i = Pr(good j e x = xi) = p
1￿￿
1￿￿p < p;
Pr(good j e x = 0) = p:
38If she receives the maximum amount of prior art, the PTO prefers not to make any comple-
mentary search e⁄ort, as only an applicant with a good innovation will reveal the full amount.
If she observes the intermediate level, the ￿rst order condition (4) gives
E￿

















We then show that p(￿) and p(￿) are increasing with ￿. Therefore, as long as (p;￿) 2 ￿l, the
examiner makes a strictly positive e⁄ort, and E￿
il > E￿
1l = 0. Thus, unlike the previous case,
revealing an intermediate amount yields more scrutiny e⁄ort from the examiner. If (p;￿) 2 ￿l,
not only must uncertainty as to the value of the innovation be high enough, uncertainty about
the prior art ￿eld must also be high. A maximum is reached for p = 1=(2￿￿) > 1=2 that solves
dE￿
il=dp = 0. Otherwise, if (p;￿) = 2 ￿l, the e⁄orts are such that E￿
i = E￿
1 = 0.
Can this strategy be part of an equilibrium? A good applicant has no incentive to deviate
from revealing the truth, as the examiner infers that only good applicants reveal the truth.
Formally, inequality (6) is always satis￿ed, as V G > V R. Nevertheless, a bad applicant is
expected to always conceal some prior art. Thus, we should have (1 ￿ E￿
i )￿i￿ > (1 ￿ E￿
1)￿1.
Because E￿
1 = 0 and ￿1 = 1, this inequality is equivalent to (1 ￿ E￿
i )￿i￿ > 1, which is never
satis￿ed. Therefore, the applicant may decide to report truthfully in order to fool the examiner,
who believes that only good applicants report the full amount of prior art. By reporting as
expected, a bad applicant can get a patent by chance, when the examiner grants a patent based
on her updated beliefs. If he now decides to report all of the prior art he found, he de￿nitively
obtains a patent, as the examiner believes he has a good innovation and reports truthfully. This
con￿rms that this is not an equilibrium.
Using the same argument, we show that the examiner will not make any e⁄ort when she
observes the full amount of prior art, but she will not give a patent, either. When she observes
the intermediate level of prior art, she makes a positive e⁄ort. A good applicant will not
deviate, whereas one who has a bad innovation will deviate, as he can get a patent by fooling
39the examiner. This is not an equilibrium. The examiner can also believe that no applicants will
report truthfully. By the same token we show that this cannot be an equilibrium.
Concavity of the bene￿t functions of the PTO
In the case of mixed strategies, we show that the bene￿t functions are concave in their own
argument (namely, E1 and Ei). If the examiner receives e x = 1 or e x = xi, her payo⁄s are respec-
tively B(E1;￿1)￿K=(1 ￿ E1) and B(Ei;￿i)￿K=xi (1 ￿ Ei), where the gross bene￿t functions
B(:) are de￿ned by (3), and ￿1 and ￿i are de￿ned by equations (12) and (13). After rewrit-
ing these bene￿t functions, we calculate the ￿rst and second derivatives. When the examiner




which is always negative at the equilibrium values. Therefore, the bene￿t functions are locally
concave. This is the ￿rst step of the proof of the existence of solutions.
Subgame Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
There exists a semi-separating equilibrium in which a bad applicant randomizes his revelation
decision. Equations (10), (16) and (17) must be satis￿ed. From the ￿rst equation, ￿1(￿)(1 ￿




where ￿￿ < 1 is always satis￿ed if E￿
1 > E￿
i ; and ￿￿ > 0 if p < p￿(￿) = (1 ￿ E1)=((1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿
Ei)+￿ (1 ￿ E1)). This last condition is equivalent to checking that ￿1(￿￿) < 1. Assume for the
moment that E￿
1 > E￿
i and that p < p￿(￿) (we will determine under what circumstances this
condition holds in the last part of the proof).
To prove the last part of the Lemma 3 we calculate the following derivatives @￿￿=@p < 0,
@￿￿=@￿ > 0, @￿￿=@E1 < 0, and @￿￿=@Ei > 0:
Proof of Proposition 1: Semi-separating equilibrium
We need to check that
i. there exists a solution (E￿
1;E￿
i ), where E￿
1 2 [0;1] and E￿
i 2 [0;1],
40ii. this solution is unique in the interval considered.
Before doing so, recall that the two functions E1(Ei) and Ei(E1) are decreasing, and thus
we rewrite them as
E1(Ei) = 1 ￿ ￿1(Ei)
1
2;
Ei(E1) = 1 ￿ ￿i(E1)
1
2:
By analogy to the Cournot model, we call these expressions ￿ reaction functions￿ . Some assump-
tions are crucial in order to have solutions; in particular, to insure real solutions, we need to
impose that ￿1(Ei) ￿ 0 and ￿i(E1) ￿ 0. So the crucial assumptions are Ee x(1) < 1 (or, equiva-
lently, K > 0) and Ee x(0) < 1 (to insure that ￿e x(0) ￿ 0). Let us now detail the analysis of the
existence and unicity of positive solutions.
i. Existence
We know that the bene￿t functions of the PTO are concave. We then have to prove that the
solutions are positive. Ideally, we need to have E￿1
1 (0) > Ei(0) and E￿1
i (0) > E1(0). However,
because of the complexity of the reaction functions, we will not explicitly ￿nd the constellation
of parameters (￿;p) such that these two conditions hold.
We ￿rst consider a weaker condition. According to the reaction functions, if E1(1) > 0 and
Ei(1) > 0, then E1 (0) > 0 and Ei (0) > 0 and, thus, there exist interior solutions between 0
and 1. We can easily derive a constellation of parameters such that these two conditions are
satis￿ed. However, these conditions are very restrictive, and if one, or even both, of them are
not satis￿ed, we can still have positive solutions (we will consider that problem later). It is easy
to check that E1(1) > 0 if p 2 [r0
1(￿);r00
1(￿)] where r0




1(￿) = [￿W +
p
(￿W)2 ￿ 4K￿W]=2￿￿W. Similarly, Ei (1) > 0 is satis￿ed if p 2
[r0
i(￿);r00
i (￿)]; where r0
i(￿) = [xi￿W ￿
p




(xi￿W)2 ￿ 4xiK￿W]=2(1 ￿ ￿)xi￿W. We represent these functions in a graph
(￿;p) (￿gure 1). Thus, for a constellation of parameters (￿;p) 2 f(￿;p)=p ￿ r0
i(￿);p ￿ r0
1(￿)g,
there exists a positive set of e⁄orts. However, on the left of r0
i(￿); for instance, we can still have
a candidate pair. So the constellation (￿;p) such that p = r0
i(￿) corresponds to Ei (1) = 0. For
a given p, the limit Ei (1) decreases as ￿ increases (i.e., @Ei (1)=@￿ < 0), for p < 1=2(1 ￿ ￿).
Hence, there exists a function Ri(￿) such that for p ￿ Ri(￿), the optimal solution is E￿











we start from point A in ￿gure 1 and increase ￿, ￿rst the optimal solution can still be positive,
but as the limit decreases there is one value of ￿ for which the optimal solution becomes negative.
By the same token, the same reasoning applies to E1(1), and a function R1(￿) exists such that
for p < R1(￿), the optimal solution is E￿
1 < 0.
We have de￿ned explicit functions, Ri(￿) and R1(￿), such that there exists a pair of e⁄orts
(E￿
1,E￿
i ) 2 [0;1] ￿ [0;1], that we represent in ￿gure 1 for a constellation of parameters (￿;p) 2
￿ = f(￿;p) j p ￿ Ri(￿);p ￿ R1(￿)g (a set that is less restrictive than the previous set).
For some values of p, E￿
1 > 0 is satis￿ed, whereas E￿
i > 0 is not. In other words, the examiner
makes an e⁄ort E1 after observing the maximum prior art, but no e⁄ort after observing the





that belongs to [0;1] if p < p1 = 1￿E1
1￿E1￿. We check that p1 > r00
1; and thus ￿￿
1 2 [0;1].
For another constellation of parameters, none of the inequalities E￿
1 > 0 and E￿
i > 0 are
satis￿ed. Thus, the examiner will not make any e⁄ort and the applicant is indi⁄erent if ￿1(￿) =
42￿i(￿), which is only satis￿ed for ￿ = 1. This is actually the equilibrium in pure strategies that
we de￿ned earlier.
ii. Uniqueness














After computation of these two second derivatives, a simple comparison shows that this is
true as long as E￿
1 > E￿
i . Thus, we have shown that there exists a unique pair of solutions
(E￿
1;E￿
i ) 2 [0;1] ￿ [0;1] for (￿;p) 2 ￿.
So far, we have assumed that E￿
1 > E￿
i . We now have to show for which constellation of
parameters (p;￿) the inequality E￿
1 > E￿
i holds, inside the constellation of parameters ￿. Let
us ￿rst re-de￿ne the functions E1(Ei) and Ei(E1) as
E1(Ei) = 1 ￿ ￿1(Ei;p;￿)
1
2;
Ei(E1) = 1 ￿ ￿i(E1;p;￿)
1
2:
We then de￿ne the value of E1 (respectively, Ei) when the reaction function E1(Ei) (re-
spectively, Ei(E1)) cuts the function Ei = E1. In other words, we determine E such that
E1(E) = E, which is (1 ￿ E)2 = ￿1(E;p;￿), and Ei(E) = E; which is (1 ￿ E)2 = ￿i(E;p;￿).
As E1 = Ei, there exists a value of E such that ￿1(E;p;￿) ￿ ￿i(E;p;￿) = 0. The solution
of this equation is E(p;￿). If we plug this solution back into the previous equation we have
￿1(E(p;￿);p;￿) ￿ ￿i(E(p;￿);p;￿) = 0 ￿ G(p;￿) that only depends on p and ￿. By totally
di⁄erentiating G(:), we determine the sign of the function p(￿) that represents all the values of












Therefore, dp=d￿ < 0, as long as sign(@G=@￿) = sign(@G=@p).
So we have de￿ned the function p(￿) such that E￿
1 = E￿
i = E. Let us depart from this
point. Assume that E￿
1 = E + "; where " is small. We have (1 ￿ E)2 + " = ￿1(E;p;￿) and
(1 ￿ E)2 = ￿i(E;p;￿), that gives ￿1(E(p;￿);p;￿) + " ￿ ￿i(E(p;￿);p;￿) = 0. Hence, E￿
1 > E￿
i
for p > p(￿).
43Lastly we must check that p < p￿(￿); in order to get an equilibrium (i.e., ￿￿ > 0). Thus,
p must be larger than p(￿), as well as smaller than p￿(￿), so (￿;p) 2 ￿ = f￿;p=p > p(￿) and
p < p￿(￿)g:
Therefore, there exists a unique pair of solutions (E￿
1;E￿
i ) 2 [0;1]￿[0;1] and ￿￿ 2 [0;1], such
that E￿
1 > E￿
i for (￿;p) 2 ￿ \ ￿ ￿ ￿.
Comparative statics in the general case
In the absence of an analytical formulation for e⁄orts, we need to study how the functions
E￿
1(Ei) and E￿
i (E1) are a⁄ected by a change in one parameter in order to determine the impact
of the change of this parameter on the equilibrium values. Let us call this parameter y, which
can be ￿W (with WG ￿ WR=constant), p, xi, ￿ and K. Let us rewrite E￿




i (E1) = 1 ￿
p






j(y); where j = 1;i. We show that ￿0
1(y) < 0 for y = ￿W;p (for p < 1=2￿),
￿0
1(y) = 0 for y = xi, and ￿0
1(y) > 0 for y = K;￿ (for ￿ > 1=2p). The function E￿
1(Ei) is
decreasing (respectively, increasing) with K;￿ (respectively, ￿W;p) and is constant with xi. By
the same token, we ￿nd that ￿0
i(y) < 0 (respectively, positive) for y = ￿W;xi;p (for p < 1=2),
and ￿ (for ￿ < (2p ￿ 1)=2p) (respectively, y = K). The function E￿
i (E1) is increasing with
￿W;xi;p, ￿ (respectively, decreasing with K).




i , where E￿
1 is de￿ned by (18) and E￿
i by (19), is equivalent to showing
that
p(1 ￿ 2￿) > xi
1+xi ￿ ￿:














i for (p;￿) 2 ￿ = f(p;￿) j (1 + xi)(p(1 ￿ 2￿) + ￿) ￿ xi > 0g.
Proof of Corollary 2
44The proof consists in the calculation of the derivatives of E￿
1 and E￿
i with respect to p, ￿.
Proof of Corollary 3
The result of Corollary 3 is trivial for ￿ ￿ ￿1 from the calculation of the derivatives
@E￿
1t=@WG < 0 and @E￿
it=@WG < 0.
Proof of Lemma 3
Convexity of e￿(￿) = e￿















































￿3 ] < 0;








@￿ > 0 when ￿ close to 1:



























1 ￿ E1 (￿) + ￿
@E1(￿)
@￿ ￿ ￿2 @Ei(￿)
@￿
￿






(p￿V + V G):

























Thus for any 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1,
@e1(￿)
@￿ > 0 , ￿ < ￿3
(￿3+xi)(p+￿￿p￿):
Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for @e1(￿)=@￿ > 0 for any ￿ is
￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿3
￿3+xi:












(p￿V + V G) < 0 )
@e(￿)
@￿ > 0:
Proof of Lemma 4: comparative statics for the optimal e⁄ort of the applicant














Proof of Lemma 5: Prior art search
Using (21) and (23), the applicant search more when ￿ = 1 than when he is truthful if
￿ [E￿
1 (1) ￿ E￿
1t] + (1 ￿ ￿)[E￿




1 (1) > E￿
1t and E￿
i (1) > E￿
it:
Simple calculations shows that for any ￿ 2 (0;1), we have E￿






Similarly, we have E￿
i (1) > E￿















46Proof of Lemma 6
The e⁄orts (24) and (25) can be written as
ESPER




i = 1 ￿ ￿Si(￿)
1
2;




xi￿W￿WSPER(1￿p)p￿(WG ￿ WR) > 0;










Further, there exists a value of ￿ 2 (0;1) such that ￿S1(￿) = ￿Si(￿). Denote ￿s such a value.
Hence, for any ￿ < ￿s, ￿S1(￿) < ￿Si(￿) and, therefore, ESPER
1 > ESPER
i .
Proof of Proposition 3
We ￿rst show that for any ￿ > 0, the introduction of the SPER initiative increases (respec-
tively, reduces) the number of patent applications submitted with e x = 1 (respectively, e x = xi).
In the emerging ￿eld, it is easy to show that the the number of patent applications in absence
of the SPER initiative regime is higher than in its presence:




In the emerging ￿eld, the number of applications is higher under the SPER regime, as
p￿ + (1 ￿ p)￿ + (1 ￿ p)￿￿￿
SPER > p￿ + (1 ￿ p)￿ + (1 ￿ p)￿￿￿:
Second, we show that the total number of patents granted is lower in the mature ￿eld as
￿SPER





47To see that, we di⁄erentiate ￿SPER


















1 =@￿ < 0, @￿SPER
1 =@E1 > 0, @E1=@￿ < 0, @￿SPER
1 =@Ei < 0 and @Ei=@￿ > 0:
Third, to show that the quality of patents granted in the mature ￿eld decreases with ￿, we
￿rst rewrite the quality as
QSPER
1 = ESPER
1 + (1 ￿ ESPER
1 )￿SPER
1 ;
= p￿ + ESPER
1 (1 ￿ p￿) + p(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ESPER
i ):



































d￿ > 0. The

































as all of the derivatives are positive with respect to ￿.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let A = (EA
1c;EA
ic) be a policy such that EA
ic < EA
1c. In such a policy, the equilibrium beliefs






1￿￿p = ￿i < p:















ic . With this new policy, upon receiving e x = 1, the examiner will check with
accuracy EA0
1c > EA0
ic . Thus, a bad applicant will never choose to report e x = 1, even if he can.
Thus, ￿A0





48The examiner exerts e⁄ort EA0
1c , pays a cost C(EA0
1c ) = 1=(1 ￿ EA0
1c ), and follows her judgement.
It is obvious that policy A0 dominates policy A, since they have the same screening e¢ ciency.
But A is more costly than A0, as C(EA0
1c ) < C(EA
1c), even though C(EA0
ic ) = C(EA
ic).
Ex Ante Commitment: Comparison of the levels of e⁄ort
In the case of commitment, Ec is the solution of
de(E)




xi(1￿Ec)] + e(E)[p(1 ￿ p)￿W ￿
(￿xi+(1￿￿))K
xi(1￿E)2 ] = 0:
If we de￿ne E as the solution of
p(1 ￿ p)￿W ￿ (￿xi + (1 ￿ ￿)) K
xi(1￿E)2 = 0;
it is easy to prove that E < Ec.
Let us rewrite the condition to obtain E￿
1 as





and the condition to obtain E￿
i as






A comparison of these conditions leads to E￿
i < E < Ec for p < d1, and that E￿
1 < E < Ec for








and d2 < d1. The constellation of parameters (p;￿) for which p < d1 is much larger than for
which p < d2. In fact, we can also show that there exists a function H > d2 such that E￿
1 = Ec
and, therefore, for values of (p;￿) 2 fp;￿=d1 > p > Hg, E￿
i < Ec < E￿
1.
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